GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard ------------------------------- Version 1.4.6 Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Intro ----- GnuPG is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in RFC2440. GnuPG works best on GNU/Linux or *BSD systems. Most other Unices are also supported but are not as well tested as the Free Unices. See http://www.gnupg.org/download/supported_systems.html for a list of systems which are known to work. See the file COPYING for copyright and warranty information. Because GnuPG does not use use any patented algorithms it is not by default fully compatible with PGP 2.x, which uses the patented IDEA algorithm. See http://www.gnupg.org/why-not-idea.html for more information on this subject, including what to do if you are legally entitled to use IDEA. The default public key algorithms are DSA and Elgamal, but RSA is also supported. Symmetric algorithms available are AES (with 128, 192, and 256 bit keys), 3DES, Blowfish, CAST5 and Twofish. Digest algorithms available are MD5, RIPEMD/160, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Compression algorithms available are ZIP, ZLIB, and BZIP2 (with libbz2 installed). Installation ------------ Please read the file INSTALL and the sections in this file related to the installation. Here is a quick summary: 1) Check that you have unmodified sources. See below on how to do this. Don't skip it - this is an important step! 2) Unpack the tarball. With GNU tar you can do it this way: "tar xzvf gnupg-x.y.z.tar.gz". If got a bzip2 compressed tarball you need to use: "tar xjvf gnupg-x.y.z.tar.bz2". 3) "cd gnupg-x.y.z" 4) "./configure" 5) "make" 6) "make install" 7) You end up with a "gpg" binary in /usr/local/bin. 8) To avoid swapping out of sensitive data, you can install "gpg" setuid root. If you don't do so, you may want to add the option "no-secmem-warning" to ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf How to Verify the Source ------------------------ In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: a) If you already have a trusted Version of GnuPG installed, you can simply check the supplied signature: $ gpg --verify gnupg-x.y.z.tar.gz.sig This checks that the detached signature gnupg-x.y.z.tar.gz.sig is indeed a signature of gnupg-x.y.z.tar.gz. The key currently used to create this signature is: "pub 1024R/1CE0C630 2006-01-01 Werner Koch (dist sig) " If you do not have this key, you can get it from the source in the file doc/samplekeys.asc (use "gpg --import doc/samplekeys.asc" to add it to the keyring) or from any keyserver. You have to make sure that this is really the key and not a faked one. You can do this by comparing the output of: $ gpg --fingerprint 0x1CE0C630 with the fingerprint published elsewhere. Please note, that you have to use an old version of GnuPG to do all this stuff. *Never* use the version which you are going to check! b) If you don't have any of the above programs, you have to verify the SHA1 checksum: $ sha1sum gnupg-x.y.z.tar.gz This should yield an output _similar_ to this: fd9351b26b3189c1d577f0970f9dcadc1234abcd gnupg-x.y.z.tar.gz Now check that this checksum is _exactly_ the same as the one published via the announcement list and probably via Usenet. Documentation ------------- The manual will be distributed separately under the name "gph". An online version of the latest manual draft is available at the GnuPG web pages: http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/ A list of frequently asked questions is available in the GnuPG distribution in the file doc/FAQ and online as: http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/faqs.html A couple of HOWTO documents are available online; for a listing see: http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html A man page with a description of all commands and options gets installed along with the program. Introduction ------------ Here is a brief overview on how to use GnuPG - it is strongly suggested that you read the manual and other information about the use of cryptography. GnuPG is only a tool, secure usage requires that YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING. The first time you run gpg, it will create a .gnupg directory in your home directory and populate it with a default configuration file. Once this is done, you may create a new key, or if you already have keyrings from PGP, you can import them into GnuPG with: gpg --import path/to/pgp/keyring/pubring.pkr and gpg --import path/to/pgp/keyring/secring.skr The normal way to create a key is gpg --gen-key This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create good random numbers for the key parameters, GnuPG needs to gather enough noise (entropy) from your system. If you see no progress during key generation you should start some other activities such as moving the mouse or hitting the CTRL and SHIFT keys. Generate a key ONLY on a machine where you have direct physical access - don't do it over the network or on a machine also used by others, especially if you have no access to the root account. When you are asked for a passphrase use a good one which you can easily remember. Don't make the passphrase too long because you have to type it for every decryption or signing; but, - AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT - use a good one that is not easily to guess because the security of the whole system relies on your secret key and the passphrase that protects it when someone gains access to your secret keyring. One good way to select a passphrase is to figure out a short nonsense sentence which makes some sense for you and modify it by inserting extra spaces, non-letters and changing the case of some characters - this is really easy to remember especially if you associate some pictures with it. Next, you should create a revocation certificate in case someone gets knowledge of your secret key or you forgot your passphrase gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id Run this command and store the revocation certificate away. The output is always ASCII armored, so that you can print it and (hopefully never) re-create it if your electronic media fails. Now you can use your key to create digital signatures gpg -s file This creates a file "file.gpg" which is compressed and has a signature attached. gpg -sa file Same as above, but creates a file "file.asc" which is ASCII armored and and ready for sending by mail. It is better to use your mailers features to create signatures (The mailer uses GnuPG to do this) because the mailer has the ability to MIME encode such signatures - but this is not a security issue. gpg -s -o out file Creates a signature of "file", but writes the output to the file "out". Everyone who knows your public key (you can and should publish your key by putting it on a key server, a web page or in your .plan file) is now able to check whether you really signed this text gpg --verify file GnuPG now checks whether the signature is valid and prints an appropriate message. If the signature is good, you know at least that the person (or machine) has access to the secret key which corresponds to the published public key. If you run gpg without an option it will verify the signature and create a new file that is identical to the original. gpg can also run as a filter, so that you can pipe data to verify trough it cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l which will check the signature of signed-file and then display the number of lines in the original file. To send a message encrypted to someone you can use gpg -e -r heine file This encrypts "file" with the public key of the user "heine" and writes it to "file.gpg" echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine Ditto, but encrypts "hello\n" and mails it as ASCII armored message to the user with the mail address heine. gpg -se -r heine file This encrypts "file" with the public key of "heine" and writes it to "file.gpg" after signing it with your user id. gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file Ditto, but sign the file with your alternative user id "Suttner" GnuPG has some options to help you publish public keys. This is called "exporting" a key, thus gpg --export >all-my-keys exports all the keys in the keyring and writes them (in a binary format) to "all-my-keys". You may then mail "all-my-keys" as an MIME attachment to someone else or put it on an FTP server. To export only some user IDs, you give them as arguments on the command line. To mail a public key or put it on a web page you have to create the key in ASCII armored format gpg --export --armor | mail panther@tiger.int This will send all your public keys to your friend panther. If you have received a key from someone else you can put it into your public keyring. This is called "importing" gpg --import [filenames] New keys are appended to your keyring and already existing keys are updated. Note that GnuPG does not import keys that are not self-signed. Because anyone can claim that a public key belongs to her we must have some way to check that a public key really belongs to the owner. This can be achieved by comparing the key during a phone call. Sure, it is not very easy to compare a binary file by reading the complete hex dump of the file - GnuPG (and nearly every other program used for management of cryptographic keys) provides other solutions. gpg --fingerprint prints the so called "fingerprint" of the given username which is a sequence of hex bytes (which you may have noticed in mail sigs or on business cards) that uniquely identifies the public key - different keys will always have different fingerprints. It is easy to compare fingerprints by phone and I suggest that you print your fingerprint on the back of your business card. To see the fingerprints of the secondary keys, you can give the command twice; but this is normally not needed. If you don't know the owner of the public key you are in trouble. Suppose however that friend of yours knows someone who knows someone who has met the owner of the public key at some computer conference. Suppose that all the people between you and the public key holder may now act as introducers to you. Introducers signing keys thereby certify that they know the owner of the keys they sign. If you then trust all the introducers to have correctly signed other keys, you can be be sure that the other key really belongs to the one who claims to own it. There are 2 steps to validate a key: 1. First check that there is a complete chain of signed keys from the public key you want to use and your key and verify each signature. 2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates of all the introduces between the public key holder and you. Step 2 is the more complicated part because there is no easy way for a computer to decide who is trustworthy and who is not. GnuPG leaves this decision to you and will ask you for a trust value (here also referenced as the owner-trust of a key) for every key needed to check the chain of certificates. You may choose from: a) "I don't know" - then it is not possible to use any of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used as an introducer, to validate the target key. Use this if you don't know the introducer. b) "I do not trust" - Use this if you know that the introducer does not do a good job in certifying other keys. The effect is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to change the value because you got new information about this introducer. c) "I trust marginally" - Use this if you assume that the introducer knows what he is doing. Together with some other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target key then as good. d) "I fully trust" - Use this if you really know that this introducer does a good job when certifying other keys. If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help of some options). This information is confidential because it gives your personal opinion on the trustworthiness of someone else. Therefore this data is not stored in the keyring but in the "trustdb" (~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg). Do not assign a high trust value just because the introducer is a friend of yours - decide how well she understands the implications of key signatures and you may want to tell her more about public key cryptography so you can later change the trust value you assigned. Okay, here is how GnuPG helps you with key management. Most stuff is done with the --edit-key command gpg --edit-key GnuPG displays some information about the key and then prompts for a command (enter "help" to see a list of commands and see the man page for a more detailed explanation). To sign a key you select the user ID you want to sign by entering the number that is displayed in the leftmost column (or do nothing if the key has only one user ID) and then enter the command "sign" and follow all the prompts. When you are ready, give the command "save" (or use "quit" to cancel your actions). If you want to sign the key with another of your user IDs, you must give an "-u" option on the command line together with the "--edit-key". Normally you want to sign only one user ID because GnuPG uses only one and this keeps the public key certificate small. Because such key signatures are very important you should make sure that the signatories of your key sign a user ID which is very likely to stay for a long time - choose one with an email address you have full control of or do not enter an email address at all. In future GnuPG will have a way to tell which user ID is the one with an email address you prefer - because you have no signatures on this email address it is easy to change this address. Remember, your signatories sign your public key (the primary one) together with one of your user IDs - so it is not possible to change the user ID later without voiding all the signatures. Tip: If you hear about a key signing party on a computer conference join it because this is a very convenient way to get your key certified (But remember that signatures have nothing to to with the trust you assign to a key). 8 Ways to Specify a User ID ---------=----------------- There are several ways to specify a user ID, here are some examples. * Only by the short keyid (prepend a zero if it begins with A..F): "234567C4" "0F34E556E" "01347A56A" "0xAB123456 * By a complete keyid: "234AABBCC34567C4" "0F323456784E56EAB" "01AB3FED1347A5612" "0x234AABBCC34567C4" * By a fingerprint: "1234343434343434C434343434343434" "123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434" "0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434" The first one is a short fingerprint for PGP 2.x style keys. The others are long fingerprints for OpenPGP keys. * By an exact string: "=Heinrich Heine " * By an email address: "" * By word match "+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf" All words must match exactly (not case sensitive) and appear in any order in the user ID. Words are any sequences of letters, digits, the underscore and characters with bit 7 set. * Or by the usual substring: "Heine" "*Heine" The '*' indicates substring search explicitly. Batch mode ---------- If you use the option "--batch", GnuPG runs in non-interactive mode and never prompts for input data. This does not even allow entering the passphrase. Until we have a better solution (something like ssh-agent), you can use the option "--passphrase-fd n", which works like PGP's PGPPASSFD. Batch mode also causes GnuPG to terminate as soon as a BAD signature is detected. Exit status ----------- GnuPG returns with an exit status of 1 if in batch mode and a bad signature has been detected or 2 or higher for all other errors. You should parse stderr or, better, the output of the fd specified with --status-fd to get detailed information about the errors. Configure options ----------------- Here is a list of configure options which are sometime useful for installation. --enable-static-rnd= Force the use of the random byte gathering module . Default is either to use /dev/random or the auto mode. Value for name: egd - Use the module which accesses the Entropy Gathering Daemon. See the webpages for more information about it. unix - Use the standard Unix module which does not have a very good performance. linux - Use the module which accesses /dev/random. This is the first choice and the default one for GNU/Linux or *BSD. auto - Compile linux, egd and unix in and automagically select at runtime. --with-egd-socket= This is only used when EGD is used as random gatherer. GnuPG uses by default "~/.gnupg/entropy" as the socket to connect EGD. Using this option the socket name can be changed. You may use any filename here with 2 exceptions: a filename starting with "~/" uses the socket in the home directory of the user and one starting with a "=" uses a socket in the GnuPG home directory which is "~/.gnupg" by default. --without-readline Do not include support for the readline library even if it is available. The default is to check whether the readline library is a available and use it to allow fancy command line editing. --with-included-zlib Forces usage of the local zlib sources. Default is to use the (shared) library of the system. --with-zlib= Look for the system zlib in DIR. --with-bzip2= Look for the system libbz2 in DIR. --without-bzip2 Disable the BZIP2 compression algorithm. --with-included-gettext Forces usage of the local gettext sources instead of the one provided by your system. --disable-nls Disable NLS support (See the file ABOUT-NLS) --enable-m-guard Enable the integrated malloc checking code. Please note that this feature does not work on all CPUs (e.g. SunOS 5.7 on UltraSparc-2) and might give you a bus error. --disable-dynload If you have problems with dynamic loading, this option disables all dynamic loading stuff. Note that the use of dynamic linking is very limited. --disable-asm Do not use assembler modules. It is not possible to use this on some CPU types. --disable-exec Disable all remote program execution. This disables photo ID viewing as well as all keyserver access. --disable-photo-viewers Disable only photo ID viewing. --disable-keyserver-helpers Disable only keyserver helpers. --disable-keyserver-path Disables the user's ability to use the exec-path feature to add additional search directories when executing a keyserver helper. --with-photo-viewer=FIXED_VIEWER Force the photo viewer to be FIXED_VIEWER and disable any ability for the user to change it in their options file. --disable-rsa Removes support for the RSA public key algorithm. This can give a smaller gpg binary for places where space is tight. --disable-idea --disable-cast5 --disable-blowfish --disable-aes --disable-twofish --disable-sha256 --disable-sha512 Removes support for the selected symmetric or hash algorithm. This can give a smaller gpg binary for places where space is tight. **** Note that if there are existing keys that have one of these algorithms as a preference, messages may be received that use one of these algorithms and you will not be able to decrypt the message! **** The public key preference list can be updated to match the list of available algorithms by using "gpg --edit-key (thekey)", and running the "setpref" command. --enable-minimal Build the smallest gpg binary possible (disables all optional algorithms, disables keyserver access, and disables photo IDs). Specifically, this means --disable-rsa --disable-idea, --disable-cast5, --disable-blowfish, --disable-aes, --disable-twofish, --disable-sha256, --disable-sha512, --without-bzip2, --disable-exec, --disable-card-support and --disable-agent-support. Configure command lines are read from left to right, so if you want to have an "almost minimal" configuration, you can do (for example) "--enable-minimal --enable-rsa" to have RSA added to the minimal build. --enable-key-cache=SIZE Set the internal key and UID cache size. This has a significant impact on performance with large keyrings. The default is 4096, but for use on platforms where memory is an issue, it can be set as low as 5. --disable-card-support Do not include smartcard support. The default is to include support if all required libraries are available. --disable-agent-support Do not include support for the gpg-agent. The default is to include support. --enable-selinux-support This prevents access to certain files and won't allow import or export of secret keys. --enable-noexecstack Pass option --noexecstack to as. Autdetect wether the tool chain actually support this. --disable-gnupg-iconv If iconv is available it is used to convert between utf-8 and the system character set. This is in general the preferable solution. However the code is new and under some cirumstances it may give different output than with the limited old support. This option allows to explicity disable the use of iconv. Note, that iconv is also disabled if gettext has been disabled. Installation Problems --------------------- If you get unresolved externals "gettext" you should run configure again with the option "--with-included-gettext"; this is version 0.12.1 which is available at ftp.gnu.org. If you have other compile problems, try the configure options "--with-included-zlib" or "--disable-nls" (See ABOUT-NLS) or --disable-dynload. We can't check all assembler files, so if you have problems assembling them (or the program crashes) use --disable-asm with ./configure. If you opt to delete individual replacement files in hopes of using the remaining ones, be aware that the configure scripts may consider several subdirectories to get all available assembler files; be sure to delete the correct ones. The assembler replacements are in C and in mpi/generic; never delete udiv-qrnnd.S in any CPU directory, because there may be no C substitute. Don't forget to delete "config.cache" and run "./config.status --recheck". We have also heard reports of problems when using versions of gcc earlier than 2.96 along with a non-GNU assembler (as). If this applies to your platform, you can either upgrade gcc to a more recent version, or use the GNU assembler. Some make tools are broken - the best solution is to use GNU's make. Try gmake or grab the sources from a GNU archive and install them. On some OSF systems you may get unresolved externals. This is a libtool problem and the workaround is to manually remove all the "-lc -lz" but the last one from the linker line and execute them manually. On some architectures you see warnings like: longlong.h:175: warning: function declaration isn't a prototype or http.c:647: warning: cast increases required alignment of target type This doesn't matter and we know about it (actually it is due to some warning options which we have enabled for gcc) If you are cross-compiling and you get an error either building a tool called "yat2m" or running that tool, the problem is most likely a bad or missing native compiler. We require a standard C-89 compiler to produce an executable to be run on the build platform. You can explicitly set such a compiler with configure arguments. On HP/UX you might want to try: "CC_FOR_BUILD=c89". Specific problems on some machines ---------------------------------- * Apple Darwin 6.1: ./configure --with-libiconv-prefix=/sw * IBM RS/6000 running AIX: Due to a change in gcc (since version 2.8) the MPI stuff may not build. In this case try to run configure using: CFLAGS="-g -O2 -mcpu=powerpc" ./configure * SVR4.2 (ESIX V4.2 cc) Due to problems with the ESIX as, you probably want to do CFLAGS="-O -K pentium" ./configure --disable-asm * SunOS 4.1.4 ./configure ac_cv_sys_symbol_underscore=yes The Random Device ----------------- Random devices are available in Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD. Operating systems without a random devices must use another entropy collector. This collector works by running a lot of commands that yield more or less unpredictable output and feds this as entropy into the random generator - It should work reliably but you should check whether it produces good output for your version of Unix. There are some debug options to help you (see cipher/rndunix.c). Creating an RPM package ----------------------- The file scripts/gnupg.spec is used to build a RPM package (both binary and src): 1. copy the spec file into /usr/src/redhat/SPECS 2. copy the tar file into /usr/src/redhat/SOURCES 3. type: rpm -ba SPECS/gnupg.spec Or use the -t (--tarbuild) option of rpm: 1. rpm -ta gnupg-x.x.x.tar.gz The binary rpm file can now be found in /usr/src/redhat/RPMS, source rpm in /usr/src/redhat/SRPMS Building Universal Binaries on Apple OS X ----------------------------------------- You can build a universal ("fat") binary that will work on both PPC and Intel Macs with something like: ./configure CFLAGS="-arch ppc -arch i386" --disable-endian-check \ --disable-dependency-tracking --disable-asm If you are doing the build on a OS X 10.4 (Tiger) PPC machine you may need to add "-isysroot /Developer/SDKs/MacOSX10.4u.sdk" to those CFLAGS. Note that any third-party libraries you may link with need to be universal as well. All Apple-supplied libraries (even libraries not originally written by Apple like curl, zip, and BZ2) are universal. GnuPG 1.4 and GnuPG 2.0 ----------------------- GnuPG 2.0 is a newer version of GnuPG with additional support for S/MIME. It has a different design philosophy that splits functionality up into several modules. Both versions may be installed simultaneously without any conflict (gpg is called gpg2 in GnuPG 2). In fact, the gpg version from GnuPG 1.4 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as included in GnuPG 2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching. The advantage of GnupG 1.4 is its smaller size and no dependency on other modules at run and build time. How to Get More Information --------------------------- The primary WWW page is "http://www.gnupg.org" The primary FTP site is "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/" See http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html for a list of mirrors and use them if possible. You may also find GnuPG mirrored on some of the regular GNU mirrors. We have some mailing lists dedicated to GnuPG: gnupg-announce@gnupg.org For important announcements like new versions and such stuff. This is a moderated list and has very low traffic. Do not post to this list. gnupg-users@gnupg.org For general user discussion and help (English). gnupg-de@gnupg.org German speaking counterpart of gnupg-users. gnupg-ru@gnupg.org Russian speaking counterpart of gnupg-users. gnupg-devel@gnupg.org GnuPG developers main forum. You subscribe to one of the list by sending mail with a subject of "subscribe" to x-request@gnupg.org, where x is the name of the mailing list (gnupg-announce, gnupg-users, etc.). An archive of the mailing lists are available at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html Please direct bug reports to http://bugs.gnupg.org or post them direct to the mailing list . Please direct questions about GnuPG to the users mailing list or one of the pgp newsgroups; please do not direct questions to one of the authors directly as we are busy working on improvements and bug fixes. The English and German mailing lists are watched by the authors and we try to answer questions when time allows us to do so. Commercial grade support for GnuPG is available; please see http://www.gnupg.org/service.html .